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Abstract
We analyze strategic interactions between two competing distributors of
an independent TV channel. Consistent with most of the relevant markets,
we assume that the distributors set end-user prices while the TV channel
sets advertising prices. Within this framework we show that the distributors
have incentives to internalize the fact that viewers dislike ads on TV, but no
incentives to internalize how the TV-channels prots from the advertising
market are a¤ected by end-user prices. This leads to some surprising results.
First, we show that even undi¤erentiated distributors might make positive
prots. Second, a TV channel might nd it optimal to commit to not raising
advertising revenue. Third, regulation of the advertising volume might be
welfare improving even if the unregulated advertising level is too low from a
social point of view.
Keywords: Two-sided market, coordination, regulation, TV industry
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1 Introduction
TV channels are two-sided platforms serving both advertisers and viewers. However,
in most countries TV content is sold and transmitted to the viewers by indepen-
dently owned distributors. The distributorsrole has nonetheless been neglected in
most of the literature. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of
incorporating distributors with market power in media economics analyzes. Our
ndings suggest that central predictions in the literature might be reversed.
To investigate the role of the distributors, we set up a model with one content
provider ("TV channel") and two distributors. The distributors earn revenue solely
from the end-user market, while the TV channel makes revenue from the advertiser
market and from charging the distributors. The distributors are horizontally dif-
ferentiated a-la Hotelling. Each viewer connects to one and only one distributor,
and has to pay a connection fee as well as a price for accessing TV content (viewer
price). Consistent with observed price setting roles in most countries, we assume
that connection and viewer prices are set by the distributors, while advertising prices
are set by the TV channel. In our basic model we consider a pay-per-view price.
Other things equal, this means that the distributors make higher prots the longer
the viewers watch TV. However, our main results are robust to a relaxation of this
assumption.1
In line with empirical investigations, we assume that the viewers dislike ads on
TV. Thus, the higher the advertising volume, the lower will be the willingness to
pay for watching TV. According to the existing theoretical literature, we should
therefore expect that a TV channel which does not air ads (for instance due to
regulatory interventions) will have higher viewer prices than a channel with ads.
1In the Appendix we solve the model under the assumption that consumers pay a xed fee
for accessing a TV channel (independent of actual viewing time). More specically, we analyze
whether viewers will want to buy a premium channel in addition to a basic bundle of TV channels
o¤ered by a distributor. The viewers are heterogeneous, so that the number of viewers buying the
premium channel depends on the price. We show that our main results are valid also in this case.
In fact, they hold as long as the price elasticity with respect to total consumption of TV-programs
is di¤erent from zero. See Appendix A1.
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Somewhat surprisingly, our model predicts the reverse result.
To understand this seemingly counterintuitive result, note that since the distrib-
utors do not receive advertising revenue, they will not internalize the positive e¤ect
that a low viewer price has on the industrys ability to raise advertising revenue
through increasing the viewing time. However, they will internalize the negative
e¤ect that ads have on the viewersdemand for TV programs. For this reason, a
distributor will take into account that when it triggers its costumers to watch more
TV programs, it also triggers the TV channel to sell more advertisements. Since the
latter is negative for the distributors, they will thus have incentives to set higher
program prices than what would maximize prots if the TV channel for some rea-
son were restricted in its ad volume. Hence, there is a counter-productive struggle
between the TV channel and the distributors which leads to ine¢ ciently high prices.
We show that a distributors ability and incentives to use high program prices
as a vehicle to reduce the advertising level are increasing in its market share. A
distributor with a large market share will thus have higher viewer prices than a
smaller rival, and the prices will be higher than what would otherwise maximize
prots. An interesting implication of this is that prots per viewer are decreasing in
a distributors market share. This softens the competition between the distributors
when they set the connection fees, because each of them knows that capturing more
viewers than the rival leads to lower prots per viewer. Indeed, this mechanism
softens competition to such an extent that the distributors make positive prots
even if they are undi¤erentiated. This is in sharp contrast to standard results,
where undi¤erentiated rms make zero prots in competitive equilibria.
Our model can easily be applied to analyze the consequences of regulating the
amount of advertising on TV. It follows from our discussion that setting a binding
advertising cap inuences the market outcome even if the regulated amount of ad-
vertising is set equal to the one we would observe in an unregulated economy. The
reason is that a cap eliminates the distributorsincentives to use high program prices
as a vehicle to reduce the advertising volume. The TV channel can exploit this by
setting a higher wholesale price. A cap on the amount of advertising will therefore
lead to higher prots for the TV channel and lower prots for the distributors. Per-
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haps most interestingly, an advertising cap will also increase welfare, independent
of whether the market otherwise underprovides or overprovides ads.
There are numerous articles analyzing the TV industry as a two-sided market.
Gabszewicz et al. (2004), Anderson and Coate (2005), and Kind et al. (2007,
2009), for instance, analyze the nature of competition between media rms, but they
abstract from the distribution segment of the market. Armstrong (1999), Stennek
(2007), Weeds (2009) and Bergh (2011) explicitly analyze the role of distributors
incentives, and focus on the incentives for a TV channel to be exclusively distributed.
Hagiu and Lee (2011) have a similar focus, and show that the incentives for exclusive
distribution depend on whether it is the content provider or content distributors who
control prices in the end-user market. Bel et al. (2007) and Kind et al. (2010) are
concerned with the market imperfections that arise in the relationships between such
rms, but do not analyze vertical strategic interaction between a content provider
and competing distributors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our
model, and in Section 3 we analyze the market equilibrium. In Section 4 we provide
some concluding remarks.
2 Some preliminaries
We model a TV industry where a variety of di¤erentiated TV programs are supplied
by a TV channel and sold to consumers on a pay-per-view basis by two competing
distributors.2 We assume that each consumer connects to one and only one distrib-
utor. To simplify the algebra, we normalize the number of available programs to
unity, and treat the number of programs that a consumer watches as a continuos
variable. Let u = c(1 c) be the gross utility that a representative consumer derives
if he consumes the c programs he likes the most.
The consumers pay a monetary price equal to pi per program they watch at
distributor i = 0; 1. Additionally, the net utility of watching TV depends on the
advertising level, Ai; the more ads there are in the programs, the lower the consumer
2The assumption of pay-per-view is relaxed in Appendix A1
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surplus, all else equal. This reects the fact that most viewers seem to dislike ads on
TV.3 To capture this, we let the subjective consumer cost for watching a program be
(pi + Ai) ; where  > 0 is a parameter scaling the disutility of being exposed to ad-
vertisements.
Consumer surplus from watching TV at distributor i is thus given by
si() = ui   (pi + Ai) ci: (1)
Solving @si=@ci = 0 gives the following per-consumer demand for TV-programs:
ci(Ai; pi) = (1  Ai   pi) =2: (2)
We open up for the possibility that the consumers consider the distributors as being
horizontally di¤erentiated. There are several reasons why this might be the case, for
instance that the distributors use di¤erent transmission technologies or that they
o¤er other channels in addition to the channel included in the model. The exact
source and magnitude of the di¤erentiation are of no importance for our results.4
Like Armstrong (1999) and Stennek (2007) we therefore assume that the degree
of di¤erentiation is exogenous, and that the consumerspreferences are uniformly
distributed over a Hotelling line of unit length. Distributor 0 is located to the far left
on this line, and distributor 1 to the far right. The degree of di¤erentiation between
the distributors is measured by the "transportation costs" parameter t  0:
The distance between a consumer located at x and distributor 0 is given by
x 2 [0; 1] : The net utility from connecting to distributor 1 for this consumer equals
U0 = v   tx+ s0   F0;
where v is a positive constant and F0 is the subscription fee charged by the dis-
tributor.5 The net utility from connecting to distributor 1 is likewise given by
3It is well documented that viewers consider advertising breaks on TV as a bad; see Moriarty
and Everett (1994), Danaher (1995), and Wilbur (2008).
4In fact, our results also hold in the special case where the distributors are perceived as perfect
substitutes.
5For a distributor o¤ering triple-play, v > 0 may for instance represent the utility of telephone
and internet access.
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U1 = v  t (1  x) + s1 F1:We assume that v is su¢ ciently large to ensure market
coverage, and that each distributor has a positive market share. Setting U0 = U1
we then nd that the number of viewers connected to distributor i equals
Ni =
1
2
+
(si   Fi)  (sj   Fj)
2t
; (3)
for i; j = 0; 1, i 6= j; and Ni = 1 Nj:
Let f be the wholesale price that the TV channel charges each distributor per
program a viewer watches. Setting other costs equal to zero, distributor is prots
can be expressed as
i = Ni [ci (pi   f) + Fi] : (4)
Note that f is distributor is marginal cost and the TV channels marginal revenue
per program consumed.
In addition to the revenue that the TV channel makes from the distributors, it
also earns revenue from the advertising market. Letting r denote the price per ad
per viewer, advertising revenue equals rA0N0+rA1N1:6 We assume that the content
provider cannot discriminate between the distributors in terms of advertising levels
per program, so we may set A0 = A1 = A: Since N0 + N1 = 1; the TV channels
prot can be expressed as
 = rA+ f (N0c0 +N1c1) ; (5)
where the rst and second terms are the revenue that the TV channel makes from
the advertising market and from the distributors, respectively.
By advertising, a producer is able to inform consumers about the products it sells,
and the more programs a consumer watches, the greater is the likelihood that he
becomes aware of a given ad. The expected value of an ad is thus increasing both in
the number of viewers and in each consumers viewing time. We consequently follow
Reisinger (2010) in assuming that the gross benet for a representative producer of
inserting an ad is (Nici +Njcj) : If producer k buys Ak advertising slots, its prot
6Alternatively, we could have assumed that the advertiser pays per slot. It can easily be shown
that this would not change our results.
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function is consequently equal to
k = (Ac0   Ar)N0 + (Ac1   Ar)N1; (6)
where k = 1; ::; n:
The rst-order condition for advertiser ks demand for ads is found by using
equations (2), (3) and (6) to solve @k=@Ak = 0: Setting A =
nX
Ak and using that
N0 +N1 = 1, we have
A =
n
n+ 1
N0 (1  p0) +N1(1  p1)  2r

: (7)
Equation (7) shows that advertising demand is decreasing in the program prices
charged by the two distributors. This simply reects the fact that higher program
prices reduce the time consumers spend watching TV. We further see that the num-
ber of advertisers merely serves to scale total advertising demand. As a simplica-
tion, we therefore set n = 1. The Appendix shows that our qualitative results hold
for any nite number of advertisers.
Inserting for equations (2) and (7) into equation (5) we can now express the
content providers prots as a function of prices and market shares:
 =
1  2r   (N0p0 +N1p1)
2
r +
1 + 2r   (N0p0 +N1p1)
4
f: (8)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (8) is advertising revenue and the second
term is revenue earned from the distributors.
Using equations (2), (4) and (7) we nd the prot level of distributor i :
i = Ni

1 + 2r   pi +Nj (pj   pi)
4
(pi   f) + Fi

: (9)
Before solving for market equilibrium, the following may be noted (see Appendix
A2 for proof):
Lemma 1: Aggregate prots for the content provider and the distributors are
maximized by setting;
(a) pi = 0 and A > 0 for   1=3,
(b) pi > 0 and A > 0 for  2 (1=3; 1) and;
7
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(c) pi > 0 and A = 0 for   1.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is straight forward; if the audience has a strong aver-
sion towards ads (  1), aggregate prots are maximized by letting the programs
be advertising-free. Otherwise, the audiences willingness to pay for watching TV
will be excessively low. If the aversion to advertising is weak, on the other hand, it
is optimal to set a low end-user price to increase consumption of TV programs and
sell more ad space. Indeed, for   1=3 it would be optimal with negative viewer
prices, if feasible. Finally, for  2 (1=3; 1) aggregate prots are maximized through
setting a positive end-user price and a positive advertising level.
3 Market equilibrium
Below, we analyze a three-stage game. At stage 1 we let the content provider
determine the wholesale price f . At stage 2, after observing the wholesale price,
the distributors compete for viewers by setting connection fees. The content prices
and the advertising price are set simultaneously at stage 3. Since a consumer can
only buy content from the distributor he is connected to at stage 3, a rational and
forward looking consumer will anticipate and take into account the stage 3 content
prices when choosing distributor at stage 2.
Summing up the game:
1 . The content provider sets the wholesale price f .
2 . The distributors set connection fees, F0 and F1, and each consumer decides
which distributor to connect to.
3 . The distributors set program prices (p0 and p1) and the content provider sets
the advertising price, r.
The structure of the game reects what we consider to be the degree of exibility
in the prices.
Before we solve the game, it is useful to nd the equilibrium program prices if
the advertising level is xed at A = A: From equations (2) and (4) we then have
8
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i = Ni [ci (pi   f) + Fi] ; with ci =
 
1   A  pi

=2: Distributor is prot is thus
independent of pj; and solving di=dpi = 0 yields
pi =
 
1   A+ f =2: (10)
For the sake of later use, we state the following result:
Lemma 2: Suppose that the advertising level is xed at A  0 Then each
distributors prot-maximizing price is
(a) independent of the price charged by its rival (dpi=dpj = 0), and
(b) decreasing in the viewersdisutility of ads if A > 0 (dpi=d < 0).
The statements in Lemma 2 are intuitive. Part (a) is a direct implication of the
fact that the consumers choose distributor at stage 2. There is thus no competition
between the distributors when they set their program prices at the nal stage of the
game. Part (b) is also rather obvious; for any given advertising level, the willingness
to pay for watching TV is decreasing in the viewersdisutility of ads. We therefore
nd that the greater the disutility, the lower will be the optimal program prices.
We are now ready to solve the three-stage game to nd the market equilibrium,
and we use backward induction. When solving for the last two stages, we implicitly
assume that advertising levels and program prices are non-negative. The conditions
which ensure that this holds are derived when we analyze the rst stage.
3.1 Stage three
At this stage the distributors set their program prices and the content provider its
advertising price, all taking the wholesale price f and the distributorsmarket shares
(N0 and N1) as given. It is instructive to solve the optimization problems for the two
types of agents separately. Starting with the TV channel, we nd that @=@r = 0
yields
r =
1 + f   (N0p0 +N1p1)
4
: (11)
The higher the wholesale price f , the more does the TV channel gain from a
large consumption of TV programs, c.f. equation (5). The incentives to enhance
9
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the viewing time at the cost of having a low advertising volume is consequently
increasing in f (dA=df < 0). Since the demand curve for ads is downward-sloping
we thereby nd dr=df > 0. Higher program prices, on the other hand, reduce the
viewing time and thus also demand for ads. This explains why dr=dpi < 0: Finally, if
the viewersdisutility of ads increases, it is optimal to reduce the advertising volume
and instead charge a higher advertising price, such that dr=d > 0:
Let us now turn to the distributorsmaximization problem. Solving @i=@pi = 0,
we nd
@i
@pi
=

ci + (pi   f)@ci
@pi

+ (pi   f)@ci
@A
@A
@pi| {z }
+
= 0: (12)
The terms in the square bracket in equation (12) show that setting a higher program
price has the standard direct e¤ect of increasing the prot margin and reducing sales.
However, there is also a positive indirect e¤ect of increasing the program price,
namely that it reduces the advertising level (@A=pi < 0). In isolation, this increases
consumption of TV-programs (@ci=@A < 0). Since the distributors prot margin
is equal to (pi   f); the value of this increased consumption is given by the term
outside the bracket in (12). Each distributor will consequently have an incentive to
set a relatively high program price in order to reduce the content providers sales
of advertising space. In Appendix A3 we show that this has the following striking
implication:
Proposition 1: Assume that the distributors are symmetric and that f > 0:
Program prices are then higher if the advertising level is endogenously positive than
if it is exogenously set to zero:
The result that the price for watching a program with ads is higher than for
watching a program where the advertising level is xed to zero is at the outset
rather surprising, since the viewersmarginal willingness to pay is decreasing in the
ad level. Hence, it is seemingly in contradiction to Lemma 2 (b). However, the
paradoxical result in Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of the fact that when
the advertising level is endogenous, the distributors choose a high program price in
order to limit the TV channels sales of advertisements.
10
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Solving distributor is maximization problem at stage 3, given by rst-order
condition (12), we nd
pi =
1 + 2r + f +Nj (pj + f)
2(2 Ni) : (13)
From equation (13) we observe, as we would expect, that distributor i responds by
charging a higher program price if the wholesale price (f) increases (dpi=df > 0).
We also see that program prices are increasing in the advertising price (dpi=dr > 0).
This is simply because a higher advertising price decreases the advertising level,
which in turn increases the viewerswillingness to pay for the programs.
The most surprising observation from equation (13) is the fact that pi is a func-
tion of pj. This is in stark contrast to the result in Lemma 2 (a), which states that
program prices are strategically independent if the advertising level is exogenously
determined. Since it is still true that the viewers are locked in when the distributors
set the program prices, it must be through the endogenous advertising level that the
prices are strategic complements;
Remark 1: Program prices are strategic complements through the e¤ects they
have on the advertising level.
To see the intuition for Remark 1, suppose that distributor j charges a higher
program price. The result will be that the consumers connected to distributor j
watch less TV (dcj=dpj < 0). This reduces the willingness to pay for ads, and the
TV channel responds by selling fewer advertising slots. Since less advertising is to
the benet of all viewers, they end up with a higher willingness to pay for watching
TV, independent of which distributor they are connected to. Thus, it will be optimal
for distributor i to charge a higher program price too.
Solving equations (11) and (13) simultaneously, and setting N1 = 1 N0, gives
11
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the following equilibrium prices
r =
3(1  f) + 5f
24
  (N0   1=2)
2
D
(14)
p0 =
3 (1 + f) + f
6
+
N0   1=2
D (1 +N0)
 1 (15)
p1 =
3 (1 + f) + f
6
  N0   1=2
D (2 N0) 1
; (16)
where D = 6 [5 +N0 (1 N0)] = [3(1  f) + f] > 0.7
Consistent with the TV channels reaction function, equation (11), we see that
the advertising price is increasing in f and . The same qualitative relationship
holds for program prices; dpi=df > 0 and dpi=d > 0. The fact that end-user prices
are increasing in f is a standard result; higher marginal costs lead to higher selling
price. The intuition for why program prices are increasing in the advertisement
disutility (), is that an increase in disutility leads to lower advertising demand and
sales. This has a positive e¤ect on the willingness to pay for watching TV, which in
turn makes it optimal for the distributors to increase program prices. Note that this
result (dpi=d > 0) is the opposite of what we found with an exogenous advertising
level, c.f. Lemma 2 (b):
Proposition 2: The prices of programs;
(a) increase with the disutility of ads if the advertising level is endogenous, and;
(b) decrease with the disutility of ads if the advertising level is exogenous.
From rst-order condition (12) it can be shown that independent of any size
di¤erences between the distributors, we always have c0 = c1 and p0 = p1 if the
advertising level is xed. Interestingly, this changes if the advertising volume is
endogenous. This can be seen from equations (15) and (16), which show that pi > pj
if Ni > 1=2. The explanation hinges on the fact that program prices, through
their e¤ect on total consumption level, determine the optimal advertising volume.
Recall that demand for advertising depends on the total viewing time at the two
7Remark 1 and equations (14) - (16) are proved for an arbitrary number of advertisers in
Appendix A4 and A5, respectively.
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distributors, and the audience shares (N0 and N1) serve as weights that settle each
distributors e¤ect on total consumption. This implies that a distributor with a large
market share to a greater extent than its rival is able to a¤ect advertising demand.
This can be veried by di¤erentiating (7) with respect to pi :
@A
@pi
=
 Ni
2
: (17)
To see how the size of the market share a¤ects the consumersprice sensitivity
through the advertising market, we totally di¤erentiate (2) with respect to pi
dci
dpi
=
1
2

  @A
@pi
  1

: (18)
Inserting for (17) into (18) we have
dci
dpi
=  2 Ni
4
: (19)
Program demand at distributor i is thus less sensitive to the price it charges the
larger its market share. For a distributor with a large market share, this translates
into a higher optimal program price:
Lemma 3: When the advertising level is endogenous, a distributor charges a
higher program price the larger its market share.
An implication of Lemma 3 is that the larger the market share of distributor
j, the higher demand distributor i will face from each of its connected consumers.
Formally this is seen from
dci
dpj
=
1 Ni
4
> 0 :
The larger distributor thus imposes a positive externality on its rival. Put di¤er-
ently, the smaller distributor "free rides" on the high program price charged by the
larger distributor. This has the interesting implication that prots per viewer for
a distributor decrease with its market share. To see this, let Ii  ci (pi   f) dene
prots per viewer for distributor i: We then have
dIi
dNi
= ci
dpi
dNi
+ (pi   f)
dci
dNi
; (20)
13
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where
dpi
dNi
=
9 (2 + 6Ni +N
2
i )
[3(1  f) + f]D2 > 0 and
dci
dNi
=  9 [11  2Ni (1 Ni)]
4 [3(1  f) + f]D2 < 0: (21)
Inserting for (21) into (20) yields
4  dI1
dN1
=  27 (3 +N1)

1 + 6 (1 N1)2 +N31

8 [3(1  f) + f]D3 < 0:
We further have d4=4
d=
= 2f
3(1 f)+f > 0.
We can state:
Proposition 3: A distributors prot per viewer is decreasing in its market
share, and more so the greater the viewersdisutility of ads.
An interesting implication of the results above is that joint prots would increase
if the distributors had reduced the end-user prices while the content provider had
maintained the advertising level. In this sense end-user prices are ine¢ ciently high.
As stated by Lemma 3, the larger the market share for a distributor, the higher
its price. Hence, the larger distributor charges the most ine¢ cient price, and will
consequently also make the lowest per-viewer prot. Size therefore comes with a
cost in terms of lower prot per captured consumer (though a distributors total
prots are increasing in its market share; di=dNi > 0):
We have now derived the outcome at stage 3, which determines end-user and
advertising prices as functions of the distributorsmarket shares.
3.2 Stage two
At stage 2 the distributors compete for the consumers by setting connection fees,
F0 and F1. The connection fees determine the market shares N0 and N1; which we
have seen to be crucial for the third stage outcome.
When choosing the optimal connection fee, distributor i maximizes
i = Ni [ci (pi   f) + Fi] (22)
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with respect to Fi; taking into account that the consumers are forward looking.
In Appendix A8 we show that this gives rise to a unique, symmetric equilibrium.
Omitting subscripts, we have
F = t 

3(1  f) + f
12
2
: (23)
Note that we might interpret F as the connection fee net of any marginal costs for
the distributors.8 It then follows from equation (23) that the connection fees can be
set below the distributorsmarginal costs (but above zero). This can occur if the
transportation cost, the wholesale price or the disutility of ads are su¢ ciently low.
Such pricing is in line with observations, as we sometimes see that distributors for
instance o¤er connection equipment at a subsidized price.
For any xed wholesale price f = f; equation (23) implies that:
Proposition 4: Assume f > 0: Then each distributor charges a connection fee
which;
(a) is increasing in transportation costs t and the marginal wholesale price ( dF=dt >
0; dF=d f > 0), and;
(b) is decreasing in the viewersdisutility of ads ( dF=d < 0):
Since high transportation costs dampen competition between the distributors,
it is a standard result that the connection fee is increasing in the transportation
cost. A higher advertising disutility reduces the advertising volume. Other things
equal, this increases the distributorsper-viewer revenue at stage 3. Thereby each
distributor will have a stronger incentive to set a low connection fee, in order to cap-
ture viewers from its rival; this business-stealing e¤ect explains why dF=d < 0: A
higher marginal wholesale price, on the other hand, reduces the distributorsprot
margins, and thus also their business-stealing motive. Therefore the connection fee
is increasing in f ; dF=df > 0:
Inserting for (23) into the distributorsprot function we nd
8If we solved the model with a positive marginal cost K;we would nd that the connection fee
equals P = F +K
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 =
t
2
+

3(1  f) + f
24
2
: (24)
From equation (24) we derive the standard results that the distributors are harmed
by higher marginal costs (df > 0), but benet from being perceived as more dif-
ferentiated (dt > 0). More interestingly, equation (24) shows that the distributors
prot increases with the consumersdisutility of ads for any given wholesale price
f; even though the connection fee is decreasing in . The intuition follows from
Proposition 3; the higher is , the more prots per viewer will fall for a distributor
when it expands its market share. Thus, it is more costly to capture a large share of
the market when  is high, and this e¤ect softens competition.9 The result is that
the distributorsprot is higher than the standard Hotelling prot t=2, and even
more remarkable, positive also for t = 0:
Proposition 5: The distributors make positive prots even if they are undi¤er-
entiated ( t = 0).
3.3 Stage one
We now turn to stage 1, where the wholesale price f is determined. This could
clearly be done in several di¤erent ways, for instance through a bargaining process
between the content provider and the distributors. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns
out that the TV channel - the rm that receives the advertising revenue - may have
incentives to set f such that it is credible that there will be no ads in the programs.
In order to demonstrate this, we shall assume that the TV channel unilaterally sets
the wholesale price. We thus solve
f = argmax f = rA+ f (N0c0 +N1c1)g : (25)
The rst-order condition implies that
9There is also a second reason why d=d > 0; namely that since dpidNi > 0 and
dpj
dNi
< 0; it must
also be true that ddNi (u(pi)  u(pj)) < 0. Thus, the larger market share a distributor is expected
to gain, the more it must reduce the connection fee in order to persuade the marginal viewers to
connect.
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f  = 3
17   3
102   (2 + 9) ; (26)
with df=d > 0. The wholesale price is increasing in , because the higher the
disutility of advertising, the less advertisements it is optimal for the TV channel to
sell, all else equal. An increase in  thus makes it optimal for the TV channel to set
a higher wholesale price in order to increase revenue from the consumer side of the
market.
Given f , the prot of the TV channel and the distributors are respectively
 =
9
2 [102   (2 + 9)] ; (27)
 =
t
2
+

2 (3 + )
102   (2 + 9)
2
: (28)
From the analysis above, we know that the TV channel is adversely a¤ected by
the fact that the distributors strategically increase program prices in order to repress
the advertising level. Since high program prices in turn reduce the TV channels
sales of programs, the question arises whether it could actually be protable for the
content provider to commit to being advertising-free. For such a commitment to be
credible, the TV channels prot margin from the consumer side must be so high
that selling ads becomes unprotable. The following can now be veried:10
Lemma 4: If the TV channel commits to being advertising-free, it maximizes
its prot by setting f = f , where
(a) f  = 1
2+1
> 1
2
for  < 1=2; and
(b) f  = 1=2 for   1=2
Other things equal, the incentive to sell advertising space is decreasing in :
This means that the higher is ; the lower is the critical value of the wholesale price
which ensures that it is optimal for the content provider to set A = 0: This explains
why df=d < 0 for  < 1=2: If the consumersdisutility of ads is su¢ ciently high,
though, the content provider prefers not to sell ads even if the wholesale price is
10See Appendix A10.
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equal to the one that would have been optimal in a one-sided market (f = 1=2).
Thereby we have f  = 1=2 for   1=2:
Inserting for f  into the prot function of the content provider yields  =

2(2+1)2
for  < 1=2 and  = 1=16 otherwise. Since the content provider prefers
to have no ads if  > ; we can use equation (27) to nd:
Proposition 6: Suppose that  >   3  11 p47 =37 = 0:34: Then the
TV channel chooses a wholesale price ( f = f ) which makes it credible that the
programs will carry no ads:The prot level of each distributor equals  = t=2 < :
Somewhat paradoxically we thus nd that even though the inclusion of ads in
the programs is a form of product damaging from the distributorspoint of view,
their prots fall if the TV channel commits to not selling ads. The reason is that
prots per viewer will then be independent of market size, such that the competition
softening mechanism discussed in 3.2 disappears. In this case the distributors will
thus only make the standard Hotelling prot.11
Finally, note that since f = 1=2 would have been optimal from the content
providers point of view in a one-sided market, and the end-user price is increasing
in f for any given advertising level (and in particular for A = 0), a direct implication
of Lemma 4 is that:
Corollary 1: The existence of an advertising market implies that end-user prices
are higher than they would be in a one-sided market if  <  < 1=2:
3.4 A regulatory cap on advertising
Many countries have restrictions on the amount of advertising allowed on TV, and
there is a large strand of literature that discusses pros and cons of such regulation
(see for instance Anderson and Coate, 2005, Peitz and Valletti, 2008, and Kind et
al, 2007). The typical result is that advertising caps harm TV channels, but that
the net e¤ect for society is ambiguous. The ambiguity is partly due to the fact
11The advertising level is thus positive only if  < 0:34; and it can further be shown that positive
viewer prices require  > 0:12: Assumption 1 above consequently holds for 0:12 <  < 0:34:
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that equilibrium ad levels may be too high or too low from a social point of view,
depending on, inter alia, the consumers disutility of ads. Not surprisingly, the
literature argues that if there is too little advertising in a free market economy, then
a binding cap on advertising reduces welfare. However, the existing models neglect
the role of distributors. The aim of this section is to show that once we include
distributors in the analysis, we nd that a cap on ads may benet TV channels and
actually improve welfare even if the market undersupplies ads.
Let p and r denote viewer and advertising prices in the symmetric equilibrium
derived above, and let p^ and r^ denote the corresponding prices in a regulated econ-
omy, where A^ is the advertising cap. Assume further that the advertising cap is set
at the unregulated equilibrium level, A^ = A:
The rst thing to note is that the distributors incentives to set (ine¢ ciently)
high program prices in order to repress the advertising level is no longer present.
It can therefore be shown that the advertising cap reduces program prices (p^ <
p); such that the consumption level increases: c^  c(p^; A^) > c  c(p; A) for
A^ = A. The higher consumption level in turn leads to a higher advertising price.
Since the advertising volume is unchanged, it follows directly that the TV channels
advertising revenue is higher under regulation. The advertisers, on the other hand,
are indi¤erent to the cap, since by assumption we have A^ = A:
When it comes to the TV channels revenue from the consumer side of the market,
there are two e¤ects that both contribute to increasing prot: First, consumption
will be higher under regulation, which for a given wholesale price (f) clearly increases
prot. Second, since the distributors no longer strategically overprice the programs,
it is optimal for the TV channel to charge a higher wholesale price, i.e. f^ > f (see
Appendix A11).
For the distributors however, a binding advertising cap is bad news. The ex-
planation is that the cap eliminates the competition softening mechanism provided
by an endogenously determined advertising level. Regulation consequently leads to
tougher competition between the distributors. Indeed, with regulation the distribu-
tors will only make the standard Hotelling prot; i = t=2.
Since the cap leaves the advertising volume unchanged but increases consump-
19
SNF Working Paper No 11/12
tion of TV programs, it follows that the regulation is welfare improving (smaller
deadweight loss on the consumer side of the market). A stricter cap will harm the
advertising side of the market, though, and if the cap becomes su¢ ciently strict we
should expect welfare to fall. Clearly, also the TV channel is harmed if A^ << A:
However, because the cap A^ = A leads to a positive jump in welfare and in prots
for the TV channel, we can nonetheless use a continuity argument to state:12
Proposition 7: An advertising cap is welfare improving and increases the TV
channels prot unless the cap is too strict. The distributors are harmed by the cap.
4 Some Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the TV industry, with its two-sided
nature, is a¤ected by the fact that end-user prices typically are set by distributors
and not by TV channels. Most theoretical studies have neglected the distributors
role, and in this paper we have shown that central predictions from the existing
literature may be reversed by incorporating such rms. For instance, end-user prices
may be higher in a TV channel with ads than without ads, distributors may make
a positive prot even when they are perceived as being perfect substitutes, and an
advertising cap may be welfare improving even when the non-regulated advertising
level is too low from a social point of view.
The key to understanding these results is to note that imperfect vertical coor-
dination leads to an equilibrium where the advertising level is ine¢ ciently low and
program prices are ine¢ ciently high. The underlying mechanism which has hitherto
been neglected in the literature is that distributors internalize the negative e¤ect
advertising has on demand for TV programs, but do not internalize the positive
e¤ect a high consumption of TV programs has on advertising revenue.
12A curiosity is that an advertising cap A^ > A might actually be employed to increase the
advertising level. The intuition for this is most easily seen by noting that if the cap is set just
above market equilibrium, then a distributor will be better o¤ by setting program prices which are
optimal given the regulated advertising level, rather than by setting a higher price with the aim of
reducing the advertising level to the non-regulated level.
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In order to illustrate as simply as possible the consequences of the fact that
di¤erent rms set prices on the two sides of the market, we assume that the TV
channel sets a linear wholesale price to the distributors. Standard intuition would
tell us that the TV channel has incentives to boost consumption and advertising
revenues by selling its programs at a low price to the distributors. However, we
nd that we may have exactly the opposite result - the TV channel could be better
o¤ by setting a very high wholesale price in order to credibly commit not to sell
advertisements. More generally, we nd that in such a market structure the amount
of advertising is lower than what is optimal for the TV industry as a whole.
In theory the rms could use sophisticated wholesale contracts to internalize the
externalities across the two sides of the market. In particular, they could let the
distributorspayment to the TV channels depend on the TV channelsadvertising
revenues. However, well informed regulators and TV distributors claim that the cur-
rent industry norm is a wholesale price that depends on the number of subscribers
and not on the TV channelsadvertising revenues.13 If the wholesale contract speci-
es a linear price, or even a two-part tari¤, it means that the industry does not fully
internalize the fact that di¤erent rms set prices on the two sides of the market.
It is consequently necessary to understand the strategic behavior of distributors to
understand the functioning of the TV industry, and the present paper is a step in
that direction.
13See Ofcom (2010), where they write the following concerning regulation of the pay TV industry:
.. we proposed to put in place linear, per subscriber prices such that a retailers payments for the
wholesale channels would increase linearly with the number of subscribers. Our proposed approach
is the current industry norm. (paragraph 10.36, p. 521) ... The Three Parties (BT, Top UP
TV and Virgin Media) agreed with our proposed approach to set linear, per subscriber charges
in recognition of the fact that this is the current industry norm. (paragraph 10.37, p. 521)
Although linear prices are the industry norm, both the Three Parties and Sky argue that they
should be able to negotiate two-part tari¤s However, this would not solve the problems related to
the two-sidedness of the market that we focus on.
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5 Appendix
Appendix A1: Proof that the Stage 3 results hold with time-independent
viewer prices
This section shows that the main results from stage 3 are not restricted to a
"pay-per-view" setup. As in the main section, let there be two distributors and
a unit mass of consumers. To make comparisons with the results in Section 3.3.
meaningful, we assume that the distributorsmarket shares are determined at an
earlier stage.
Both distributors sell a basic bundle of channels and unlimited access to some
premium content, for instance a premium channel. We assume that the distributors
employ tying strategies, i.e. conditional on having bought the basic bundle, the
consumer can buy access to the premium content. This is the most common business
model both in Europe and the USA.14 We will now analyze the pricing game when
the distributors set access prices to their base of costumers.
The net utility for a type  s u[0; 1] consumer is:
s() =    pi   A; (A1)
where pi is the price of access,  is the disutility of advertisements, and A is the
advertising level. The consumer buys access if s()  0; thus, for the indi¤erent
consumer i = pi + A. The share of the population that buys access is then:
1  i = 1  [pi + Ai] : (A2)
Having a market share Ni the distributor then faces demand Ni(1   i)i. If the
content provider charges a linear wholesale price f per viewer, distributor i and the
content provider make the following prot, respectively:
i = Ni

(pi   f)
 
1  i

+ Fi

; (A4)
 = rA+ f

N0
 
1  0

+N1
 
1  1

: (A5)
14See, for instance, Crawford (2008) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2011).
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As in the "pay-per-view" section, the price of an advertisement is r.15
For simplicity, assume that if a consumer buys access to the content provider,
he will consume all the available content. The number of viewers that is exposed
to an advertisement is then N0
 
1  0

+N1
 
1  1

. We can then write the prot
function for advertiser k; given by equation (6) in the main section, as:
k = AkN0
 
1  0

+N1
 
1  1
  Akr:
By rst solving @k=@Ak = 0 for Ak and then setting n = 1 we obtain the advertising
demand as:
A =
1  r  N1p1  N0p0
2
: (A7)
The optimal access price charged by distributor i = 1; 2 is characterized by:
@i
@pi
= Ni
 
1  i
 Ni @
@pi
+
@
@A
dA
dpi

(pi   f) = 0; (A8)
where @=@pi = 1, @=@A =  and dA=dpi =  Ni=2. Using equation (A7) we
obtain the best response function:
pi =
1 + (2 Ni) f + r + (1 Ni) pj
2 (2 Ni) : (A9)
From equation (A9) we observe that here, as in the main section, @pi=@pj > 0 : Thus,
end-user prices are strategic complements. This result corresponds to Remark 1 in
the main section, and the intuition is analogue.
The best response function for the TV channel when it sets the advertising price
is:
r =
1 + f  Nipi   (1 Ni)pj
2
: (A10)
The three rst order conditions constitute a system of there equations and three
unknowns. By solving the system we obtain:
15We can use equations (A4) and (A5) to show that Lemma 1 from the "pay-per-view" section
holds also for this set-up. That is, aggregate industry prots are maximized with A > 0 if  < 1
and A = 0 if  > 1
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p0 = D
 1 f9 + f (11 + 3) +N0 [3 + f (1  4N0 + )]g ; (A11)
p1 = D
 1 f12 + f (8 + 4) N0 [3  f (7  4N0 + )]g ; (A12)
r = D 1 f4 [1  f (1  2)] +N0 [5 (1 N0) (1  f) + 3f (1 N0)]g ;(A13)
where D = 4 [5 +N1(1 N1)]. From equations (A11) and (A12) it follows that
@pi=@. It can easily be shown that if the advertising level is exogenous, we have
pi = (1 + fi   A)=2. This result corresponds to Proposition 2 in the main section.
The expected net revenue per consumer for distributor i is i(f;)
Ni
= (1   i)pi.
It can now be shown that:
@

i(f;)
Ni

@Ni
< 0 and
@2

i(f;)
Ni

@Ni@
< 0:
Thus, when a distributor increases its market share, the expected net revenue per
viewer decreases. This result corresponds to Proposition 3 in the main section.
Setting Ni = 1=2 in equation (A11) and (A12) we obtain:
p0 = p1 =
1 + f
2
+
1
6
f (A12)
It is straight forward to show that the optimal end-user price is pi = (1+f)=2 if the
advertising level is xed to zero. Thus, from equation (A12), it follows that the price
is higher than when the advertising level is xed to zero. This result corresponds to
proposition 1 in the main section.
Appendix A2: Proof of Lemma 1
Maximizing ( + 0 + 1) from equations (8) and (9) with respect to p0; p1 and
r; we nd that the FOCs describe a unique, symmetric equilibrium where all second-
order conditions and non-negativity constraints are satised if 1=3 <  < 1: The
prices and the advertising level are then equal to
p0 = p1 = 3
   1=3
6   2   1 ; r = 
 + 1
2 (6   2   1) and (29)
A =
1  
6   2   1 : (30)
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From (29) and (30) we immediately see that pi > 0 i¤  > 1=3 and A > 0 i¤  < 1:
Q.E.D.
Appendix A3: Proof of Proposition 1
The program price with exogenous advertising levels is given by equation (10).
By evaluating this equation for A = 0 we obtain pA=0i =
1+f
2
: From equation (15)
we further nd that pi jN0=N1= 1+f2 + f6 with endogenous advertising levels. The
di¤erence between the prices is pi jN0=N1   pA=0i = f6 > 0 Q.E.D.
Appendix A4: Proof of Remark 1 with n advertiser
The FOC for distributor i is:
@i
@pi
= ci +
2664 @ci@pi|{z}
 
+
@ci
@A|{z}
 
@A
@pi|{z}
 
3775 (pi   f) = 0
where
ci(Ai; pi) = (1  Ai   pi) =2
and
A =
n
n+ 1
Ni (1  pi) +Nj(1  pj)  2r

;
so @ci=@pi =  1=2, @ci=@A =  =2 and @A=@pi =  nNi=(1 + n). Substituting
this into the FOC we obtain:
@i
@pi
=
1
2

n
n+ 1

2r + (Ni   1) (pi   pj) + 1  pi
n

+

n
1 + n
Ni   1

(pi   f)

= 0
(31)
Now, set n = 1 and solve (31) for pi to obtain equation (13). It follows directly from
equation (13) that @pi=@pj > 0. Q.E.D.
Appendix A5: Derivation of equilibrium prices at stage 3 with n ad-
vertisers
With an arbitrary number of n advertisers, equations (8) and (9) become
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 =
n
1 + n
1  2r   (N0p0 +N1p1)

r +
1 + 2nr   (N0p0 +N1p1)
2 (1 + n)
f and
0 = N0

1  p0 + n [2r  N1 (p0   p1)]
2 (1 + n)
(p0   f) + F1

:
Solving @0=@p0 = @1=@p1 = @=@r = 0 yields
r =
(n+ 2) (1  f) + f (n+ 4)
8 (n+ 2)
 

N0   1
2
2
(n+ 1)
2
(32)
p0 =
(n+ 2) (1 + f) + fn
2 (n+ 2)
+

N0   1
2

(nN0 + 1) (33)
p1 =
(n+ 2) (1 + f) + fn
2 (n+ 2)
 

N0   1
2

[n (1 N0) + 1]; (34)
where   n[(n+2)(1 f)+fn]
(n+2)[(n+4)(n+1)+2n2N1(1 N1)] : Equations (32) - (34) show that the qualita-
tive relationship between prices at stage 3 and distributor 1s market share is the
same as in equations (14) - (16). Q.E.D.
Appendix A6: Proof of Propostion2 with n advertisers
Consider the stage 3 prices given by equation (33) and note that:
@p0
@
= f
n [n (1 +N0) + 2]
2 [4 + 5n+ n2 + 2n2N0 (1 N0)] > 0:
Appendix A7: Proof of Lemma 3 with n advertisers
Under endogenous advertising levels, the derivative of end-user price with respect
to the market share is:
@pi
@Ni
=

3
2
  2Ni

n+ 1

+
d
dNi

Ni   1
2

[n (1 Ni) + 1]
where
d
dNi
=  2n31  2Ni
n+ 2
n  2f   fn+ fn + 2
(4 + 5n+ n2 + 2n2Ni (1 Ni))2
: Q:E:D:
Appendix A8: Derivation of the stage 2 equilibrium connection fees
Inserting for (32) - (34) into the viewersutility function we nd
d (u0   u1)
dN0

N1=
1
2
=  n [(n+ 2) (1  f) + fn]
2
4 (n+ 1) (n+ 2) (3n+ 4)
:
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Di¤erentiating N0 = 12 +
u0 u1
2t
  (F0 F1)
2t
with respect to N0 around the symmetric
equilibrium (N0 = N1 = 1=2) we have
dN0
dF0

N0=
1
2
=
1
2t
(
 n [(n+ 2) (1  f) + fn]
2
4 (n+ 1) (n+ 2) (3n+ 4)
)
dN0
dF0

N0=
1
2
  1
2t
;
which yields
dN0
dF0

N1=
1
2
=   8t (3n+ 4) (n+ 1) (n+ 2)
2t

n [(n+ 2) (1  f) + fn]2 + 8t (3n+ 4) (n+ 1) (n+ 2)	 (35)
Further di¤erentiating 0 = N0 (c0 (p0   f) + F1) with respect to N0 we have the
FOC
d0
dF0
= [c0 (p0   f) + F0] dN0
dF0
+N0
d [c0 (p1   f)]
dN0
dN0
dF0
+N0 = 0: (36)
where d[c0(p0 f)]
dN0
= dII
dNi
Inserting for (35) into (36) with N0 = N1 = 1=2 we nd
F0 = t  [(n+ 2) (1  f) + fn]
2
8 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)2
(37)
Q.E.D.
Appendix A9: Proof of proposition 4 with n advertisers
The derivative of equation (37) with respect to  is:
dF
d
=  fn2 + n  f(2 + n(1  ))
4 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)2
< 0
and the derivative with respect to f is:
dF
df
=
(2 + n(1  )) [2 + n  f(2 + n(1  ))]
4 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)2
> 0:
Q.E.D.
Appendix A10: Proof of Lemma 4
There exists a non-advertising equilibrium if the content provider at stage 3
sets r such that A = 0. If distributor i expects that A = 0, it will set pA=0i =
(1 + f) =2. A pure strategy non-advertising equilibrium therefore exists if and only
if the distributors set pA=0i and the content provider sets f such that A = 0.
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The optimal advertising price as a function of the end-user prices is given by
equation (11), and inserting for pA=00 and p
A=0
1 we obtain the advertising price that is
optimal for the content provider, given that the distributors set the zero-advertising
prices. This advertising price is
r(pA=00 ; p
A=0
1 ) =
1  f + 2f
8
: (38)
If we now substitute for pA=00 , p
A=0
1 and r(p
A=0
0 ; p
A=0
1 ) into equation (7) we obtain:
A(pA=00 ; p
A=0
1 ; r
) =
1  f   2f
8
(39)
In equilibrium the beliefs must be correct. Hence, there exists a non-advertising
equilibrium if and only if equation (39) is non-positive. In particular, this means
that the content provider maximizes prots by being advertising free if f is equal
to, or higher than,
fA=0 =
1
2 + 1
(40)
In a one-sided market, i.e. if there did not exist any demand for advertising, the
content provider would solve @A=0=@f = 0, which gives f = 1=2. Q.E.D.
Appendix A11: Consequences of an advertising cap
Free-market advertising level and viewer price
Inserting for f  from (26) into equations (15) and (7) with N0 = N1 = 1=2 we
nd
A = 3
3  5
102   (2 + 9)
and
p =
75 + 82   9
102   (2 + 9)
Derivation of prices when advertising is regulated
From (10) we know that the program price with an exogenous advertising level
equals p = 1 A+f
2
. Inserting for this into (7) yields r = 1 3A f
4
: From equation (2)
we further have c = 1 A p
2
: The TV channel now maximizes (c.f. equation (5))
 = rA+ f (N0c+N1c)
28
SNF Working Paper No 11/12
with respect to f: Setting A = A this implies that
f^ =
54 + 72   9
102   (2 + 9) and p^ =
3
2
49 + 72   6
102   (2 + 9) :
We now nd that
f^   f  =  (7 + 3)
102   (2 + 9) > 0 and p^  p
 =   (3  5) 
2 [102   (2 + 9)] < 0:
Since p^ < p it follows that c^ > c: Q:E:D:
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We analyze strategic interactions between two competing distributors of an inde-
pendent TV channel. Consistent with most of the relevant markets, we assume 
that the distributors set end-user prices while the TV channel sets advertising 
prices. Within this framework we show that the distributors have incentives to 
internalize the fact that viewers dislike ads on TV, but no incentives to interna-
lize how the TV channel’s profits from the advertising market are affected by 
end-user prices. This leads to some surprising results. First, we show that even 
undifferentiated distributors might make positive profits. Second, a TV channel 
might find it optimal to commit to not raising advertising revenue. Third, regula-
tion of the advertising volume might be welfare improving even if the unregulated 
advertising level is too low from a social point of view.
